an increase in support among Catholics and the Republican candidate George W. Bush sent a letter to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops arguing that Republican policies on abortion and stem cell research were more in line with church doctrine (Hillygus and Shields 2008). It is no surprise then that, when trying to explain declining levels of Catholic partisanship, many would start with abortion and reproductive rights issues (e.g., Adams 1997; Jelen and Wilcox 2003) . The focus on abortion, however, is similar to the focus on immigration among Latinos (Barreto and Pedraza 2009) . It implicitly assumes that the group is monolithiccaring about only one issue and holding homogeneous attitudes on that issue-which causes the analyst to overlook factors that are potentially more important.
We argue that the actual explanation for mass partisan change has less to do with attitudes towards any single issue and has more to do with where people live. Abortion plays a role, but so does the partisan sorting on ideology that affected all citizens since the 1960s (Fiorina 2006 (Campbell et al., 1960) . Catholics did not align with a party simply because of nominations and appointments. Catholics were different from most of the country in ways that set them apart and stimulated Democratic allegiance: they were poorer and more urban (McAvoy, 1942) .
Poor, urban Catholics joined the Democratic New Deal coalition because of economic interests. They stayed members because their contexts -their neighborhoods and parishes -kept them Democratic. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) Reagan, but Catholics still voted more Democratic than the rest of the country until the 1990s.
Partisanship among Catholics is now similar to partisanship among non-Catholics. Forty-four years after the nomination of John Kennedy, the Democrats once again nominated a Catholic Senator from Massachusetts. That year fewer than half of Catholic NES respondents identified as Democrats.
What explains this change? The explanations given most often relate to issues. The arguments suggest that Catholic identifiers are more conservative and that as the Democratic Party moved left, Catholics adjusted their partisanship accordingly. For example, Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) argue the partisan change seen within many groups -including Catholicsis the result of conservative Democrats deciding that they were in the wrong party. Arguments like this start with the observation that party elites have become more polarized in recent years (Hetherington 2002; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) . With this increased polarization, it is easier for liberals and conservatives to recognize which party is liberal and which party is conservative. Once they notice the differences, individuals join the party that best represents their policy preferences.
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Of particular importance in the discussion of Catholic partisanship is the issue of abortion. Prior to the Roe v. Wade decision, many Republicans led the pro-choice movement, as leading Democrats did not speak in favor of abortion rights out of deference to the Catholic members of their party (Stimson, 2004) . After Roe, the party leaders took their now familiar stand on abortion, and Catholics bishops found themselves actively opposing some Democratic policies. Republicans took this opportunity to argue that their conservative platform -on abortion and other issues -was more in keeping with Catholic values (Leege et al., 2002) .
This could have affected partisanship because abortion had "evolved" as an issue (Adams, 1997) . In the case of issue evolution, the changes in elite messages surround an "easy" issue. Easy issues are largely symbolic which voters respond to at a "gut level" (Carmines and Stimson 1980) . When the parties take clear and distinct stances on that issue, then the public adjusts their views of the parties based on this issue (Carmines & Stimson, 1989) . Abortion is one of a number of "easy" issues that may have evolved in the second of half of the twentieth century as the parties have taken distinct stances on more issues (for a review see, Carmines & Wagner, 2006) . In the years following Roe, there became no doubt which party supports abortion rights. Hence, it would follow that many Catholics would identify the Republican Party as the pro-life party and leave the Democratic Party.
While arguments surrounding abortion have some appeal, they do not tell the whole story. Even though the Catholic Church's official stance is unequivocally pro-life, the membership is less so. In 2000, almost 40% of Catholic NES respondents said abortion should always be permitted. Half of George W. Bush's votes among Catholics came from people with views that were sympathetic to abortion rights. If Roe explains Catholic partisanship, then these numbers do not make sense. On top of that, while the official church position on abortion is aligned with the Republican position, it is not at all clear which party would support the church's position on other issues. For example, Gray, Perl, and Bendyna (2006) 
Moving Trucks and Partisan Realignment
Arguments about realignment due to issues or ideology ignore the important contextual changes that have taken place over the past 50 years. A contextual effect is "any effect on individual behavior that arises due to social interaction within the environment" (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1993, 298 ). An individual's neighborhood could affect political attitudes through interactions among neighbors (Segal & Meyer, 1969; MacKuen & Brown, 1987) . If an individual moved, or if individuals with different ideas moved into the neighborhood, then contextual interactions would change, and therefore, the individual's attitudes might change as well (Brown, 1981) . Even if the individuals who moved did not change their opinion of the parties, their children might view the parties differently since they are socialized in a new environment.
The composition of the neighborhoods in which Catholics live has changed over the past fifty years. Following the Second World War, Catholics began moving into the suburbs. Greer Scholars have shown that the strength of an individual's attachment to a party can change over time (Fiorina, 1981) . It is not clear, however, whether this change is meaningful, or if it is simply the result of measurement error (Green & Palmquist, 1990) . Our primary interest is in explaining why fewer Catholics are willing to say they are Democrats, therefore this measure will suffice. We divide our independent variables into three sets: (1) demographics; (2) religiosity and ideology; (3) context. These variables encompass the most likely suspects when trying to understand why the partisanship of group changed over a period of time. In the next few paragraphs, we detail how these variables are coded-each is placed on a 0 to 1 scale.
Additionally, Figure 2 and Figure 3 present percentages and means for each of these variables across the decades (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s) . 4 As we investigate possible causes for changes in mass partisanship among Catholics, it is important to look at how Catholics changed over the previous decades. [
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Education is coded 0 to 1: 0-the respondent did not graduate high school; .333-the respondent graduated high school; .6667-the respondent attended some college; 1-the respondent graduated from college. .75 68 th -95 th percentile; 1-greater than the 96 th percentile.
As you can see, from the 1970s to the 1990s, the average education increased, but that was not met with an increase in income. In fact, the income percentile in which the typical Catholic fell decreased-although, none of the pairwise comparisons are statistically distinguishable.
Religiosity/Ideology
In considering how Catholic partisanship has changed, it is important to consider how Catholics have changed: both in terms of their beliefs, but also in terms of their ties to the church. We measure their ties to the church in two ways. First, in line with social identity theory (Tajfel 1978) , we examine in-group attachment using feeling thermometer ratings of warmth towards Catholics: the measure Thermometer in the second row of Figure 2 . This shows no change in feelings towards the church across the decades. 6 Note that the scandals involving priests sexually abusing children, which may have resulted in Catholics feeling less warm towards their church, were primarily publicized in the media after 2000. Hence, any potential changes as a result of those scandals would not be reflected in this data.
Alternatively, one could measure attachment to the church by the frequency with which one is involved in church activities. The two panels on the right side of Figure 2 's second row show the proportion of individuals who say they attend church weekly, Church Always, and the proportion who say they never attend church, Church Never. The excluded group is those who say they sometimes attend church. This shows a significant change in activity. In the 1970s, 42% of Catholic identifiers said they attended church always. That number dropped eight percentage points in the 1980s and another two percentage points in the 1990s. The percentage of Catholics saying they never attend church did not change much between the 1970s and the 1980s, but there was a twelve percentage point increase between the 1980s and the 1990s. This could be the result of actual changes in behavior or could reflect a simple willingness to admit to 6 Social identity theory predicts that individuals will show in-group favoritism, out-group derogation, or both (Brewer and Brown 1998 ). An alternative measure would be to take the difference between the feeling thermometer rating for Catholics and an out-group. For this reason, we also took the difference between the feeling thermometer rating for Catholics and the rating for Protestant. This does change over the years with the difference between the two ratings getting larger. The result in Figure 2 suggests this change is more the result of more outgroup derogation over the decades than any change in in-group favoritism. The other problem with this measure is that the feeling thermometer rating for Protestants was only asked in 1972, 1976, and 2000. not attending church. Either way there seems to be a movement away from being practicing Catholics even as people still identified as Catholics.
The first two panels present other indicators of a declining religiosity among Catholic identifiers. The Pro-Life variable is coded 1 if the respondent said that abortion should never be permitted or only if the life of the woman was in danger and 0 otherwise. 7 As the figure show, the proportion of respondents who gave pro-life answers declined by almost twenty percentage points across the decades.
Bible: Literal combines two different measures. In the 1980s, the measure is coded 1 if the respondent said, "The Bible is God's word and all it says is true", .5 if the respondent said, "The Bible was written by men inspired by God but it contains some human errors", and 0 if the respondent said that the Bible was written by men. In the 1990s, the measure is coded 1 if the respondent said that the Bible should be taken literally, .5 if the respondent said the Bible is the word of God, but should not be taken literally, and 0 if the respondent said the Bible was written 7 The sharp drop seen in 1980 could be the result of a question wording change. After 1980, the ANES added the words "by law" to the question. It is possible that individuals were making a distinction between what the law should allow and their own personal morals. In 1980, they asked both forms of the question and more than three quarters of respondents had the same position on both questions. However, individuals were eight percent less likely to take the prolife position when asked the question in the "by law" form. The ANES also added language about rape and incest that year. One would expect that this change could result in more pro-life respondents because it allows for more situations in which abortions would be allowed and have the respondent still coded as "pro-life".
by men. There is a .06 decline in the mean rating between the 1980s and 1990s again suggesting a declining religiosity among Catholics.
This decline in religiosity is not matched with increased liberalism. The Ideology measure uses the standard ANES seven-point liberal conservative scale and puts it on a 0-1 scale with 0 indicating extreme conservatism and 1 indicating extreme liberalism. There is a slight move across the decades in the conservative direction, but only the change from the 1970s to the 1990s is statistically distinguishable from zero.
Contextual Measures
The final panel in Figure We measure the variable in this way because the appeals Nixon and Reagan made directly to conservative Democrats may have disproportionately affected partisanship of conservatives (Leege et al. 2002) . Additionally we include a series of control variables. The coding of these variables is available in the appendix.
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[ 10 We do not include the feeling thermometer variable from Figure 2 in this analysis because it is not available in all years. We did perform some analyses using that variable. We discuss those analyses in the Further Analyses section.
the relationship between that variable and the probability of being in that category. Positive coefficients indicate that a respondent is more likely to be a Republican or an independent;
negative coefficients indicate the respondent is less likely to be in one of those categories.
It is difficult to understand the substantive effects of a multinomial-model with interactions and for this reason, we present Figure 4 and Figure 5 . In these figures, we show the probability that a respondent is a Democrat for each of our key variables at the two ends of the time scale. Figure 4 presents the results for our religiosity and ideology variables. Figure 5 presents the results for our contextual variables.
[
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Religiosity and Ideology
The first panel in Figure 4 presents the effect that abortion opinion has on the probability By 2000, the effect of ideology had grown to 76.7 percentage points. We must note, however, that the confidence intervals on these predictions do overlap making it difficult to say conclusively that ideology plays a larger role in determining partisanship. live in cities and those who live in the suburbs. There is a 60% probability an urban Catholic will identify as a Democrat compared to a 50% probability that a suburban Catholic will do so.
This change is largely due to the increasingly Republican suburbs. The figure does not show this, but the probability of being a Republican in the suburbs doubled from 1972 to 2000. 11 We ran the same model on non-Catholics and in that specification ideology clearly plays a larger role in determining partisanship in later years with larger effects for the ideology variables in 2000.
The Cumulative Effect of Changes
In Figure 2 and Figure 3 , we showed how Catholics changed on key variables from the 1970s to the 1990s. In the previous section, we modeled how the relationship between those key variables and partisanship changed over the same time period. If we are looking at changes in mass partisanship, however, we need to take both factors into account simultaneously. For example, imagine more Catholics had a value of 1 on some dummy variable X at the end of a time series than they did at the beginning of the time series. If that X variable is always a positive predictor of Democratic partisanship, then we could say that change led to increasing numbers of Democrats among Catholics. If X became less associated with partisanship, then the increase in the percentage of Catholics with a 1 on X is potentially less relevant to explaining changes in mass partisanship.
For this reason, we perform a series of simulations to examine counterfactuals. These We carry out the simulation using the following steps.
 We create fifty datasets that are identical to the ANES cumulative file for Catholics in the 1990s.
 For a set of variables-religiosity, ideology, or context-we replace respondent's values on those variables. We randomly assign values to respondents with probabilities matching the probabilities of those values in the 1970s. Note we do this for each set of key variables separately.
 We change the coefficient of the interaction effects on those key variables to zero. This means that the relationship between the variables and partisanship is the same as it was in 1972-year 0 for the Logged Year variables. All other interaction effects are unchanged.
 We predict the probability that each respondent would be Democratic recording the mean probability for each of the 50 datasets that we created. The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 6 . The dotted vertical line on the left shows the actual mean probability of Democratic partisanship in the 1990s. To the right are density plots of the mean probabilities from the simulations on the 50 data sets. 12 The Figure   shows that without the changes in ideology-both changes in the ideological positions of Catholics and the partisan sorting that took place-the average Catholic would be about 2 percentage points more likely to identify as a Democrat. This small effect of ideological changes on mass partisanship should not be that surprising. While conservatives became less Democratic, liberals became more Democratic; hence, the actual net effect on macropartisanship is small.
What this allows us to do is determine what
The effect of religiosity is also small; it is about the same as ideology, with the mean from the simulations about half a percentage point higher. With all the attention paid to abortion and declining religiosity, why did this not have a larger effect? On the one hand, the changing Democratic positions did severe a bond with a strong voting bloc: active, observant Catholics.
On the other hand, this is a group that shrank in numbers over the next twenty years. Hence, if
we are trying to understand the changes in mass partisanship among Catholics, the Democratic Party siding with the pro-choice movement had an effect, but not as large as one would think given the attention the issue receives.
The differences between the simulated results and the actual vote share are the largest for the contextual changes. According to the simulation, 62.5% of Catholics would identify as Democratic if the contextual changes had not taken place. This is not simply the result of Catholics moving into the South and the suburbs in greater numbers. It is the combined effect of Catholics moving into those areas while those areas became increasingly Republican.
This suggests a larger point about the mass partisanship of all groups. In some instances, party efforts to specifically target groups have a large effect-for example, the partisan changes around race in the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Huckfeldt and Kohfield 1989) . In other instances, groups make up a greater or lesser part of a party for reasons beyond policy positions alone. For example, Claasseen and Povtak (2010) show that the Christian Right became a major player in the Republican Party less because of mobilization and more because of demographic changes.
We are not arguing that policy does not matter at all. Our results suggest that the policies that Democrats took that cost them Southerners also cost them some share of the Catholic vote as well. We are simply arguing that it is a mistake to argue that any particular policy or rhetorical appeal explains partisan change among a large group. We use the word "Catholic" to group 25%
of American public together. Any group that large will be diverse in many ways. Hence, the factors that explain changes in voting patterns among that group will also be complex and many of the factors that shape this group will also affect the larger public.
Further Analyses
Any analysis attempting to explain mass partisan change over a thirty year period should be greeted with caution. Data are rarely (if ever) available to test mechanisms. The measures used are largely proxy measures and measures for alternative explanations may not be available.
These concerns would apply to the current analysis as well.
For example, we can show that where Catholics live plays a large role in explaining their partisanship. We cannot show exactly how the contextual effect occurs. We suspect it occurs through a process of autoregressive influence (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004) . Without either an experiment (e.g., Huckfeldt, Pietryka, and Reilly 2014; Ryan 2013) 13 This does not necessarily demonstrate causality (Fowler et al. 2011) . For example, it is possible that those who are in disagreeable networks selected into those networks in part because they were most likely to change. Further, the partisanship of the social network is measured using the respondents' perceptions of their network which could lead to error. Huckfeldt, Sprague and Levine (2000) demonstrate that perceptions of partisanship are typically correct.
Further, as Sinclair points out in Fowler et al. (2011) , the respondent's perception of his or her discussion partners is the key variable since the respondent is reacting to his or her interactions with the social network and not the actual party attachments of the social network. While we emphasize the importance of social context in explaining partisan change, we have paid less attention to the role of social identification theory. The social identification theory centers on groups. It argues individuals identify with parties because the groups of which they are members are associated with those parties (Green, Palmquist & Schickler, 2002) . For example, proponents of social identification would argue that members of minority groups tend to be more Democratic because of the associations between the Democratic Party and minority groups. If the association between a group and a party is severed-like the association between white Southerners and the Democratic Party-then the tie that a member of that group has to the party will also eventually be severed.
Measurement issues make it difficult for us to directly address this argument as the existing data do not provide us with a good measure of how strongly Catholics identify with their 14 We conducted the same analysis using all ANES respondents. The effect in that analysis is larger-about 1 point on the scale-with a statistically significant effect for both the Gore Discussants and Bush Discussant variables. Those results are also available in the appendix.
Catholicism. The measures of religiosity are potentially proxies for strength of Catholic identity.
Hence, it is possible that the partisan change we attribute to disagreement over policy is really caused by a belief that Democrats do not care about Catholics in a way that they used to care about Catholics.
We attempt to more directly measure Catholic identity using the feeling thermometer ratings of warmth towards Catholics. As we showed in Figure 3 , the average feeling thermometer rating did not change from the 1970s to the 1990s. This does not necessarily mean that this variable cannot explain the mass partisan change. All that would be required is that the relationship between the variable and partisanship to change over the time period. Hence, we would need a statistically significant interaction between thermometer and the Logged Year indicator to find support for a social identification hypothesis using the feeling thermometer rating.
We ran several models and none resulted in a statistically significant interaction effect.
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Post-estimation analysis suggests the marginal effect of the feeling thermometer is consistent throughout the years. Further, the feeling thermometer rating is a poor predictor of Democratic partisanship at every time point from 1972-2000. The bivariate relationship between the feeling thermometer rating and partisanship is not statistically significant. Again, this result does not mean that social identification theory does not explain some proportion of the partisans change among Catholics, but we cannot distinguish between a clear social identification effect and a religiosity effect using the available data.
Conclusion
15 These models are available in the appendix. Our analysis shows that abortion policy likely played a role in the partisan change experienced by Catholics. We also show that partisan sorting explains some of the partisan change among Catholics as it does among voters more generally. However, the effect of both of these factors plays a much smaller role than the effect of context. We show that Catholics stopped being a solid Democratic voting bloc in the second half of the 20 th century largely because they no longer receive homogeneously pro-Democratic messages in their communities.
Older Catholics have left the Democratic Party in recent years with most of those defections coming among Catholics who live in the South or the suburbs. In the 1980s and 1990s, these contexts became increasingly Republican. So, the messages received by Catholics living here became increasingly Republican and some were persuaded to leave the Democratic Party and younger generations never even identified as Democrats.
All of the most prominent theories of partisan change -issue evolution, social identification, and ideological realignment -place new information at the center of their models.
All of these theories are agnostic, however, about how this new information is communicated. If most Americans are uninterested and uninformed, it seems unlikely that they would learn party positions on issues or whether parties are ignoring certain groups or what elites are saying. If individuals are not going to receive the messages on their own, they are going to come from the people around them that are paying attention (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1948; Katz, 1957) . This is why this contextual model explains the change so well. Instead of concentrating on the specific content of particular messages, it centers on which individuals are most likely to hear and accept the new messages-this is determined, in part, by an individual's social surrounding (Sinclair 2012) . What matters is the direction of the message -pro-Democratic or pro-Republican -not the issue the message addresses. For Catholics, the anti-Democratic and pro-Republican messages were heard most clearly in the increasingly Republican South and suburbs. Individuals may have been able to ignore them at first, but, as more and more of their discussions about politics had an anti-Democratic tone, those messages gained credibility. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Probabilities calculated using estimates from model in Table 1 . Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Probabilities calculated using estimates from model in Table 1 . 
